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Objective. To analyze variation in medical care use attributable to Medicare’s
decentralized claims adjudication process as exemplified in home hemodialysis
(HHD) therapy.
Data Sources/Study Setting. Secondary data analysis using 2009–2012 paid
Medicare claims for HHD and in-center hemodialysis (IHD).
Study Design. We compared variation across Medicare administrative contractors
(MACs) in predicted paid treatments per standardized patient-month for HHD and
IHD patients. We used ordinary least-squares regression to determine whether higher
paid HHD treatment counts expanded HHD programs’ presence among dialysis
facilities.
Data Collection. We identified HHD and IHD treatments using procedure, revenue
center, and claim condition codes on type 72x claims.
Principal Findings. MACs varied persistently in predicted HHD treatments per
patient-month, ranging from 14.3 to 21.9 treatments versus 10.9 to 12.4 IHD treat-
ments. The presence of facilities’HHDprograms was uncorrelated with average HHD
payment counts.
Conclusions. Medicare’s claims adjudication process promotes variation in medical
care use, as we observe among HHD patients. MACs’ discretionary decision making,
while potentially facilitating innovation, may admit inefficiency in care practice as well
as inequitable access to health care services. Regulators should weigh the benefits of
flexibility in local coverage decisions against those of national standards for medical
necessity.
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It is a basic assumption of much of the geographic variation literature that
Medicare beneficiaries have coverage for the same set of services if they
receive care in Alaska or Alabama, New England, or New Mexico.





Consequently, it is inferred that regional differences in care use and outcomes
for a given patient cohort should be attributed to differences in case mix or
provider practice patterns. Often, however, a portion of observed variation
in Medicare utilization should be attributed to heterogeneity in benefit
administration.
Medicare relies on regional Medicare administrative contractors
(MACs) to adjudicate and pay claims in accordance with established pay-
ment policy. (Prior to August 2013, this work was carried out for different
claim types by a mix of MACs, fiscal intermediaries, and carriers [Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2016]. Throughout this article, we
refer to all such administrative contractors collectively as “MACs.”) When
judging which services are “reasonable and necessary” (or meet standards
of “medical necessity”) for the care of Medicare beneficiaries—as when
evaluating new innovations in care practice—MACs have authority to
make local coverage decisions (LCDs) or to determine local claims pay-
ment guidelines (Allen and Keysor 2005; Neumann, Kamae, and Palmer
2008). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has issued
national coverage decisions or other standard guidance for approximately
one-fourth of services rendered in Medicare, leaving the majority to be
evaluated independently by MACs (Government Accountability Office
2003).
Potential benefits of decentralized coverage decision making include
increased ability to constrain spending. In particular, the MAC contract
renewal process allows Medicare to award contracts to organizations with
a demonstrated willingness to be more aggressive in denying claims for
services they deem inappropriate or fraudulent (Government Accountabil-
ity Office 2003; Neumann, Kamae, and Palmer 2008). Medicare repre-
sentatives, providers, and the medical device community have argued in
favor of this regional system, contending that it is more flexible
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and responsive to local innovations in medical care (AdvaMed 2001;
McGinley 2003).
On the other hand, the system admits heterogeneous coverage deci-
sions, leading “to different treatment for beneficiaries in different locations”
(Government Accountability Office 2003). The Government Accountability
Office (2003) described multiple services that—through varying LCDs—were
formally covered by Medicare in some localities but not others, including
whole body bone and/or joint imaging, audiology testing, diagnostic pap
smears, and bilateral deep brain stimulation. Variation in the context of ser-
vices unaddressed in formal coverage decisions may be greater still. More-
over, where variation in these coverage decisions meaningfully affects
provider reimbursement, providers may respond by modifying their service
offerings, discontinuing the provision of services unlikely to be reimbursed
adequately, and making new service offerings for services more likely to
receive adequate reimbursement.
Previously, researchers have identified effects on service utilization of
payment rates in the Medicare Fee Schedule (Hadley et al. 2003, 2009/
2010; Hadley and Reschovsky 2006), changes in Medicare payment rates
(Escarce 1993; Yip 1998; Mitchell, Hadley, and Gaskin 2000; Dafny 2005;
Clemens and Gottlieb 2014), and Medicare reimbursement structures (Ace-
moglu and Finkelstein 2008; Hirth et al. 2013; Pan and Sambamoorthi
2013). The existing research that examines heterogeneity in the subjective
coverage determinations of Medicare’s claims adjudication contractors sig-
nificantly predates the reorganization of such contracts as provided for in
the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (Smits, Feder, and Scanlon 1982;
Demlo et al. 1984). More recent evidence of this variation is limited to the
work of Carlson and colleagues, who found that how narrowly MACs inter-
pret CMS’s guidelines in hospice care reimbursement can significantly
affect Medicare beneficiaries’ care experiences (Carlson et al. 2009) and
patient outcomes, including hospitalization, expenditures, and mortality
(Carlson et al. 2010).
In this paper, we offer new evidence of variation in discretionary deci-
sionmaking in theMedicare program byMACs and underscore how this vari-
ation contributes to variation in the care received by Medicare beneficiaries.
We illustrate these points using the example of patients undergoing home
hemodialysis (HHD), comparing their experiences to those of patients under-
going in-center hemodialysis (IHD). Within this context, we also consider the
implications of this administrative variation for outcomes and dialysis provi-
ders’ service offerings.
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HEMODIALYSIS REIMBURSEMENT IN MEDICARE
Medicare is the single largest payer for dialysis services in the United States.
When undergoing traditional IHD therapy, which was received by over 90
percent of Medicare dialysis patients in 2011 (Hirth et al. 2013), most patients
attend a dialysis facility three times per week. This pattern is codified in Medi-
care’s current payment policy, which provides that dialysis facilities may be
reimbursed for only three hemodialysis sessions weekly. Payment for addi-
tional sessions may be authorized only if justified on the basis of medical
necessity (Medicare Claims ProcessingManual 2014).
Home hemodialysis therapy, an alternative to IHD, is often performed
more than thrice weekly with smaller machines designed for shorter-duration,
more frequent use (National Kidney Foundation 2015). Growing evidence
suggests greater hemodialysis frequency—five or six sessions weekly versus
the conventional three—is associated with improved mortality, overall physi-
cal health, and cardiovascular health indicators but more frequent access-
related interventions and hospitalization for infections (Chertow et al. 2010;
Foley et al. 2011; Perl et al. 2012; Weinhandl et al. 2012, 2015; Springel et al.
2013; Chan et al. 2014). This largely positive evidence and the small but grow-
ing number of patients undergoing HHD therapy have brought attention to
Medicare’s “thrice-weekly” payment policy, which is applied likewise to IHD
and HHD. Editorials and patient information sources have argued the limita-
tion to three paid treatments weekly is a barrier to more widespread use of
HHD, offering anecdotal evidence that providers have found it difficult to
provide sufficient medical justification to obtain reimbursement for additional
treatments (Knotek 2005; Rodenberger 2009; Lebeau 2012; National Kidney
and Urologic Diseases Information Clearinghouse 2013).
Home peritoneal dialysis (HPD), another alternative dialysis modality,
is comparable to HHD in terms of its logistical management: patients undergo
treatment at home with some nurse visitation and training support. However,
HPD is different from IHD and HHD both clinically—hemodialysis patients’
blood is filtered using an external artificial kidney machine, while in HPD
therapy the inside lining of patients’ abdominal cavity is used as a natural filter
—and in terms of its administered frequency—HPD patients undergo treat-
ment either once a day for an extended period of time or throughout the day,
performing dialysate exchange procedures three to five times per day, versus
the treatment frequency of three to six times per week for IHD or HHD
patients. Medicare payment for HPD is on a per-day basis with the amount set
to be the equivalent of three IHD treatments per week. Consequently, we
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focus our comparative analysis on HHD and IHD patients, although we
leverage the logistical similarities between HHD and HPD programs in mod-
els of dialysis provider operations.
Dialysis facilities’ scheduling routines and capacity constraints inhibit
rendering additional treatments per week to IHD patients. However, for
HHD patients, these constraints do not apply. In addition, while a facility
incurs certain variable costs (e.g., additional dialysate) when rendering addi-
tional HHD treatments, total per-treatment costs for these additional treat-
ments are substantially less than for preceding treatments because the costs of
many dialysis-related prescriptions and services are relatively fixed (e.g.,
incurred monthly regardless of the number of treatments) (Klarenbach et al.
2014; Walker et al. 2014; Liu et al. 2015). Consequently, for dialysis facilities
each additional home dialysis treatment per month has the potential to be
more profitable than the last. Moreover, the financial attractiveness of HHD
relative to IHD improves with each additional HHD treatment the facilities
expect will be approved for payment as medically necessary.
Recent developments in Medicare’s dialysis reimbursement policies
make providing HHD therapy still more attractive. Prior to 2011, Medi-
care’s per-treatment reimbursements covered a fixed set of “composite rate”
services, which excluded many “separately billable” prescription drugs and
laboratory services commonly used by dialysis patients. Beginning January
1, 2011, several of these previously separately billable services were added
to the bundle of services included in Prospective Payment System (PPS)
payments. These additional services (e.g., erythropoietin, vitamin D, and
iron injections), like other composite rate services before 2011, are typically
provided monthly regardless of the number of treatments. However, the
average expected use of these services per treatment at the population level
—which is used to inform PPS payment levels—largely reflects the per-
treatment costs associated with IHD treatments rendered only thrice weekly
(Hirth et al. 2013). Consequently, following the expanded bundle PPS’s
implementation, payments increased from approximately $159 per treat-
ment (composite rate payment) to $230 per treatment (base rate for the
expanded bundle before any adjusters are applied) (Hornberger and Hirth
2012), while the costs to facilities of providing formerly separately billable
services during additional HHD treatment sessions have not risen commen-
surately (Hirth et al. 2013).
Because of these changes in incentives and because of the anecdotal evi-
dence that payments for additional HHD treatments were provided inconsis-
tently, we explored variation in paid-for HHD treatments per patient-month
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across MACs and over time, before and after the implementation of Medi-
care’s expanded bundle PPS. For comparison, we likewise examined variation
in payment for IHD treatments per patient-month.
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
We determined the extent and persistence of variation in the frequency of paid
HHD and IHD treatments for a large (near 100 percent) sample of Medicare
hemodialysis patients in 2009–2012 by MAC. We used ESRD Medicare
claims data files to count paid HHD and IHD treatments, identifying
hemodialysis treatments (including both regular and training treatments)
using current procedural terminology codes 90935, 90937, 90989, or 90993
and revenue center code 0821 on bill type 72x claims. To avoid misinterpret-
ing other administrative differences as differences in decision making among
MACs, counted treatments were restricted to those with positive paid
amounts, and counts of treatments per month were rescaled to standardize
month lengths to 30 outpatient days (i.e., excluding days in hospital) and
capped at 30 treatments (one per day). We distinguished HHD treatments
from IHD treatments using claim condition code 74 (indicating home dialysis
service). We then defined HHD and IHD patient-months as months in which
the plurality of the patient’s paid dialysis treatments was HHD or IHD treat-
ments, respectively (minimum one HHD or IHD treatment). We retained
patient-months during which exactly one MAC could be identified adjudicat-
ing all of the patient’s dialysis claims. Because HHD remains uncommon, we
limited our analysis of variation across HHD patient-months to MAC-years
during which the MAC adjudicated claims for at least 100 HHD patient-
months to increase the reliability of MAC-level estimates.
Approximately two-thirds of dialysis facilities submit their claims to
the MAC with jurisdiction over their geographic region (C. Klots, Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, personal communication, July 2014).
The remaining third submits claims to MACs with jurisdiction over differ-
ent localities; these out-of-jurisdiction relationships result from exceptions
granted by CMS prior to the establishment of the current regulations pur-
suant to Section 911 of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. (We pre-
sent additional details describing our method for identifying MACs in the
Appendix SA2.)
To quantify the variation inMACs’ discretionary decision making in this
context, we estimated separate ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions by
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year by modality (HHD vs. IHD) at the patient-month (pm) level. Specifi-
cally, we use these models to identify the conditional average number of paid
HHD or IHD treatments per month within each MAC by year, controlling
for other observable differences between MACs. In these models, our depen-
dent variable Tpm represents the number of paid treatments, and our indepen-
dent variables of interest are represented by MACpm, a vector of indicators of
the MAC that adjudicated patient p’s treatment claims during month m. The
set of MAC indicators, which number between 14 and 24 across models, var-
ies by year and by modality as MAC contracts begin and lapse and as some
MACs adjudicate claims for at least 100 HHD patient-months in some years
but not others. An F-statistic was computed to determine the joint statistical
significance of these indicators.
We would expect paid treatment counts to vary with patient characteris-
tics associated with clinical need for additional treatments (or “risk”). It has
been argued—as in the somewhat differentiated LCDs established by three
MACs (First Coast Service Options, Inc. [FCSO, MAC for jurisdiction 9],
Novitas Solutions, Inc. [Novitas, MAC for jurisdictions 4, 7, and 12], and Pal-
metto GBA, LLC [Palmetto, MAC for jurisdiction 11]) (Medicare Coverage
Database 2013)—that additional dialysis treatments may be needed by
patients experiencing hyperkalemia, pregnancy, fluid overload, acute peri-
carditis, congestive heart failure, pulmonary edema, or severe catabolic state.
Where these patient characteristics varied across MACs, paid treatments per
patient-month should vary likewise. To remove the variation across MACs
due to differences in the populations whose claims MACs adjudicate, we risk-
adjust for such potential imbalances by including in our regressions an exten-
sive set of patient- and patient-month-level controls Xpm potentially related to
individual patients’ needs for additional dialysis treatments. Among these are
both time-invariant patient-level indicators captured at the time of the onset of
renal replacement therapy, as identified in the patient’s CMS Form 2728—
age (>18, 18–44, 60–69, 70–79, or <79, vs. 45–59 (ref.)), race (American Indian
or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, black, or other or multiracial, vs.
white (ref.)), body mass index (BMI < 18.5, 25 ≤ BMI < 30, 30 ≤ BMI < 40,
or BMI ≥ 40, vs. 18.5 ≤ BMI < 25 (ref.)), difficulty ambulating (yes or no),
and difficulty transferring (yes or no)—and also patient-month-level indicators
of the presence of comorbid conditions during the previous 3 months as iden-
tified using all (dialysis- and non-dialysis-related) claims: pericarditis, sep-
ticemia, pneumonia, opportunistic infections, gastrointestinal bleeding,
cancer, cardiac arrhythmia or dysrhythmia, hepatitis, anemia, monoclonal
gammopathy, myelodysplastic syndrome, sickle-cell anemia, alcohol or drug
Variation in Medicare Payments: Hemodialysis 655
dependency, congestive heart failure, cardiovascular accident, diabetes,
ischemic heart disease, pulmonary edema, pulmonary vasculitis, and
HIV/AIDS. The International Classification of Disease, Ninth Revision
(ICD-9) codes we used to identify these clinical conditions are based on those
used in CMS’s hierarchical condition categories and ESRD PPS risk adjust-
ment models (Pope et al. 2004; Leavitt 2008). The use of comorbid condition
indicators derived from both the CMS Form 2728 and claims data as controls
(in addition to other correlated covariates) compensates for observed discor-
dance in these data sources (Krishnan et al. 2015). We also included patient-
month-level indicators of total inpatient days (obtained from Medicare Part A
claims), died during the month (yes or no, obtained fromMedicare enrollment
files), and that the month is one of patient p’s first 3 months of renal replace-
ment therapy (“vintage,” derived from the date of first renal replacement ther-
apy obtained from the patient’s CMS Form 2728). Standard errors were
clustered at theMAC level.
Equation 1 presents the estimating equation in full.
Tpm ¼ MACpm þ Xpm þ gpm ð1Þ
To test the sensitivity of our findings to the incompleteness of our claims-
based comorbidity indicator variables during patients’ first three Medicare-
enrolled months—which reflect zero, one, or two preceding months of claims
rather than three, as we are limited to Medicare claims data in our analyses—
we also re-estimate our models restricting to those patients with age greater
than 65 and those under 65 undergoing dialysis at least 7 months after the
patient’s first month of renal replacement therapy. For dialysis patients under
age 65, “Medicare coverage usually starts on the first day of the fourth month
of your dialysis treatments” (Medicare.gov 2016). Therefore, 7 months is long
enough to ensure that we have at least three prior months of claims to ascertain
comorbidities.
We used our OLS regressions’ results to calculate predicted counts of
paid treatments per patient-month by MAC for IHD and HHD patient-
months, assuming everyMAC treated a “typical” dialysis patient. Specifically,
for each MAC-year and each modality, we multiplied our model coefficients
by the appropriate MAC indicators as well as characteristics of a typical dialy-
sis patient across our entire sample (including IHD and HHD patients and all
four data years), omitting only the residual. To represent the typical dialysis
patient, we selected the modal patient-month characteristics for discrete vari-
ables (e.g., male, white, did not die duringmonth), and we selected the popula-
tion mean for the sole continuous variable body surface area. We then
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summed these products to generate MAC-year-level predicted paid treat-
ments per patient-month by modality and compared these measures across
MACs to quantify and analyze variation in MAC payments strictly due to the
identity of the MAC adjudicating claims. We assessed persistence in this varia-
tion for each modality by examining changes in the range of predicted paid
treatments by MAC across years, and we assessed persistence in predicted
paid treatments by modality within each MAC over time using an intraclass
correlation statistic.
Finally, we assessed the extent to which variation in MACs’ discre-
tionary decision making may have influenced dialysis facilities’ operations
and modality offerings. Specifically, we conducted a facility-year (fy)-level
analysis of whether dialysis facilities are more likely to have a HHD pro-
gram (HHDProgfy)—defined as having two or more unique patients, each
with at least one HHD patient-month, during the year. Our key indepen-
dent variable Tf(y-1) is the average, unadjusted number of HHD treatments
paid for per patient-month by the facility f’s MAC during the preceding cal-
endar year—a marker for how the facility may perceive its MAC’s patterns
of paying for additional HHD treatments relative to other MACs. While
the specification of this variable exploits the longitudinal nature of our data,
the one-year lag necessitates that we restrict our analysis to facility-years
during the period 2010–2012. Similarly, to increase the reliability of our
estimates, facility-years were excluded from our analysis if the facility’s
assigned MAC had less than 100 HHD patient-months during the previous
calendar year.
In this analysis, our controls Xfy include indicators for the presence of an
IHD program (a small number of facilities specialize in home dialysis modali-
ties and so do not offer IHD therapy) and the presence of a HPD program—
facilities with programs for these alternative dialysis modalities may be able to
leverage clinical and technical expertise or logistical expertise, respectively,
and ease the process of initiating a new HHD program. We identify HPD
treatments using current procedural terminology codes 90935, 90937, 90989,
or 90993, and revenue center codes 0831, 0841, or 0851 on bill type 72x
claims. We specify our IHD and HPD program indicators in parallel with the
HHD program indicator’s specification. We also include year fixed effects to
control for secular trends in HHD care. Standard errors are clustered at the
MAC-year level.
Equation 2 represents the estimating equation for our linear probability
(OLS) model in this analysis.
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HHDProgfy ¼ Tf ðy1Þ þ Xfy þ efy ð2Þ
All analyses were conducted using SAS version 9.2 (Cary, NC, USA).
RESULTS
Unadjusted descriptive statistics for our HHD and IHD patient-month sam-
ples are presented in Table 1. After applying our sample inclusion criteria,
thereby excluding 2.8 percent of HHD patient-months and 2.2 percent of
IHD patient-months, our analytic samples remained large for each modality:
186,072 HHD and 12,447,294 IHD patient-month-level observations in total
across years. IHD is significantly more common than HHD, representing
98.5 percent of hemodialysis patient-months. However, HHD’s share grew
each year. As expected, HHD patient-months average significantly more paid
Table 1: Select Descriptive Statistics, Home Hemodialysis and In-Center




Mean/% SD Mean/% SD t stat.
Mean treatments per month 17.8 5.6 12.0 2.6 446.7
Age 56.7 15.3 63.2 15.0 179.4
Female 39.4% 45.7% 55.4
White 66.8% 54.7% 110.6
Black 28.3% 38.6% 97.2
Asian/Pacific Islander 3.4% 4.3% 21.8
Am. Indian/Alaskan Native 0.9% 0.6% 33.1
Other/multiracial 0.6% 0.9% 16.0
Bodymass index 29.2 7.8 28.3 7.4 44.8
Body surface area 2.0 0.3 1.9 0.3 102.0
New dialysis patient (vintage) 2.7% 4.8% 52.5
Days in hospital 1.3 3.8 1.2 3.5 11.9
Died duringmonth 1.4% 1.2% 9.1
Cancer 8.5% 7.5% 15.8
Diabetes 64.2% 77.5% 118.4
Ischemic heart disease 60.5% 69.7% 80.4
Year 2009 19.9% 24.4% 48.3
Year 2010 23.2% 25.3% 21.3
Year 2011 27.1% 24.9% 21.2
Year 2012 29.8% 25.4% 41.3
N (patient-months) 186,072 12,447,294
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treatments than IHD patient-months (17.8 treatments vs. 12.0 treatments), not
accounting for differences such as the number of days spent in hospital or
deaths during the month. HHD patients are somewhat younger, are more
likely to be male and white, and have a higher average BMI than IHD
patients. Our sample of HHD patient-months is also less likely to include
patients undergoing early dialysis care than our sample of IHD patient-
months. In general, fewer comorbidities are observed during HHD patient-
months than during IHD patient-months.
Regression results for our 2012 models of HHD and IHD are presented
in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. (Model results for other years are avail-
able upon request.) In our model of paid HHD treatments per patient-month,
15 of 17 estimates for MAC-specific effects were statistically significant; the
joint F-test of statistical significance for these effects was also strongly signifi-
cant (p < .0001). Among these estimates, the range of associated marginal
effects (approximately 6.1 treatments) was large relative to the overall mean.
Our estimates for many patient- and patient-month-level controls, including
days in the hospital, death during the month, body surface area, vintage, diffi-
culty ambulating, select age and racial/ethnic groups, sex, and several indica-
tors for comorbid conditions, were also statistically significant. Owing to our
models’ large sample sizes, most estimates were statistically significant at 0.01
percent levels.
In our model of paid IHD treatments per patient-month, 15 of 20
estimates for MAC-specific effects were statistically significant, as was the joint
F-test of statistical significance for these effects (p < .0001). Compared with
our observed effect estimates for HHD, however, the range of associated
marginal effects in this model (approximately 0.8 treatments) was much
smaller relative to the overall mean for IHD. Again, many estimates for
patient- and patient-month-level controls were statistically significant, most at
0.01 percent levels.
In Figure 1, we present predicted paid treatments per patient-month
(hereafter “predicted treatments”) by MAC for IHD and HHD during 2009
and 2012. (Comparable statistics for 2010 and 2011 are available upon
request.) Our estimates of HHD treatments greatly exceeded our estimates of
IHD treatments. We estimated predicted treatments for a typical dialysis
patient by modality by MAC-year and found that the HHD estimate of 18.8
predicted treatments was significantly greater than the IHD estimate of 12.1
predicted treatments (p < .0001).
Home hemodialysis predicted treatments varied dramatically across
MACs, ranging between 14.3 and 21.9 treatments across 2009–2012. This
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Table 2: Ordinary Least-Squares Regression Results, Model of Home
Hemodialysis Treatment Counts in 2012 at the Patient-Month Level
Variable Est. SE
AdminaStar 1.808 0.191**
CGSAdmin 1 0.563 0.189*
CGSAdmin 2 1.394 0.216**
Mutual of Omaha 0.492 0.328










Palmetto/MAC 11 0.718 0.204*
MAC12 3.604 0.202**
MAC13 3.265 0.197**
Days in hospital 0.050 0.006**
Died duringmonth 8.076 0.184**
BMI < 18.5 0.045 0.124
25 ≤ BMI < 30 0.028 0.057
30 ≤ BMI < 40 0.088 0.069
BMI ≥ 40 0.201 0.105
BSA 0.970 0.121**
Vintage 1.939 0.132**
Diff. ambulating 0.925 0.150**
Diff. transferring 0.184 0.187
Age < 18 0.967 0.526
18 ≤ Age < 45 0.238 0.056**
60 ≤ Age < 70 0.431 0.057**
70 ≤ Age < 80 0.753 0.069**
Age ≥ 80 1.550 0.095**
Am. Indian/Alaskan Native 0.697 0.220*






Bac. pneumonia 0.600 0.122**
Pneumonia 0.445 0.222
Opp. infection 0.514 0.234
GI bleed 0.332 0.152
Continued
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variation across MACs persisted over time. The range in HHD predicted
treatments across MACs—from lowest to highest predicted treatments—was
at least 5.7 in each year. Moreover, the intraclass correlation statistic for this
sample of HHD treatments was 0.677, indicative of moderate-to-strong corre-
lation and persistence in predicted treatments over time withinMACs.
By contrast, IHD predicted treatments did not vary meaningfully across
MACs or over time. Across 2009–2012, the range of IHD predicted treat-
ments was between 10.9 and 12.4 treatments.
Our results were comparable when estimated restricting to those
patients with age greater than 65 and those under 65 undergoing dialysis
at least 7 months after the patient’s first month of renal replacement
therapy (representing 95.2 percent and 96.4 percent of our main analytic
sample’s HHD and IHD patient-months, respectively; results not
shown).
The results of our facility-year-level regression of HHD program pres-




Cardiac arrhythmia 0.019 0.188
Hepatitis 0.539 0.181*
Her. hemo. anemia 0.184 0.274
Mono. gammopathy 0.648 0.223*
Myelodyplastic syn. 0.558 0.218
Sickle-cell anemia 0.551 0.477




Drug dependence 0.478 0.098**
Dysrhythmia 0.384 0.046**
Ischemic heart disease 0.061 0.050
COPD 0.183 0.045**
Peri. vascular disease 0.061 0.047
HIV/AIDS 0.564 0.135**
Intercept 13.628 0.292**
NotesN = 54,575 patient-months.
*p < .01; **p < .0001.
BMI, Body mass index; BSA, body surface area; CHF, congestive heart failure; COPD, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease; CV disease, cardiovascular disease; GI bleed, gastrointestinal
bleed; HIV/AIDS, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome; SE,
standard errors.
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Table 3: Ordinary Least-Squares Regression Results, Model of In-Center
Hemodialysis Treatment Counts in 2012 at the Patient-Month Level
Variable Est. SE
AdminaStar 0.090 0.012**
Arkansas BC 0.712 0.094**
CGSAdmin 1 0.106 0.011**
CGSAdmin 2 0.107 0.012**
Mutual of Omaha 0.078 0.045
Noridian 1 0.239 0.022**
PBSI 0.089 0.017**
UGS 0.024 0.013
MAC 1 0.023 0.009




MAC 7 0.041 0.018
MAC 8 0.049 0.012**
MAC9 0.159 0.011**
MAC10 0.105 0.009**
Palmetto/MAC 11 0.032 0.011*
MAC12 0.067 0.011**
MAC13 0.039 0.010*
Days in hospital 0.004 0.000**
Died duringmonth 6.239 0.013**
BMI < 18.5 0.061 0.007**
25 ≤ BMI < 30 0.032 0.004**
30 ≤ BMI < 40 0.091 0.004**
BMI ≥ 40 0.171 0.007**
BSA 0.009 0.008
Vintage 1.039 0.006**
Diff. ambulating 0.011 0.008
Diff. transferring 0.001 0.012
Age < 18 0.358 0.039**
18 ≤ Age < 45 0.191 0.005**
60 ≤ Age < 70 0.053 0.004**
70 ≤ Age < 80 0.074 0.004**
Age ≥ 80 0.110 0.005**
Am. Indian/Alaskan Native 0.110 0.011**






Bac. pneumonia 0.092 0.009**
Continued
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facility’s MAC pays for one additional HHD treatment per patient month on
average during the preceding year, the facility’s probability of operating a
HHD program rises 0.4 percentage points; this estimate is not statistically sig-
nificantly different from zero. Our control variables capturing IHD program
presence and HPD program presence are correlated (negatively and posi-
tively, respectively) with HHD program presence.
DISCUSSION
While Medicare is a national insurance program, it administers benefits
through regional MACs and, for many services, relies on their discretion to




Opp. infection 0.122 0.018**
GI bleed 0.005 0.010
Cancer 0.060 0.005**
Cardiac arrhythmia 0.123 0.013**
Hepatitis 0.060 0.009**
Her. hemo. anemia 0.014 0.022**
Mono. gammopathy 0.011 0.014
Myelodyplastic syn. 0.052 0.015*
Sickle-cell anemia 0.155 0.031**




Drug dependence 0.226 0.006**
Dysrhythmia 0.036 0.003**
Ischemic heart disease 0.037 0.003**
COPD 0.016 0.003**
Peri. vascular disease 0.099 0.003**
HIV/AIDS 0.099 0.008**
Intercept 12.050 0.018**
Notes: N = 3,130,342 patient-months.
*p < .01; **p < .0001.
BMI, Body mass index; BSA, body surface area; CHF, congestive heart failure; COPD, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease; CV disease, cardiovascular disease; GI bleed, gastrointestinal
bleed; HIV/AIDS, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome; SE,
standard errors.
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generate efficiencies and offer greater responsiveness to local provider con-
cerns than a uniform, national coverage decision-making process. However,
the resulting heterogeneity in decision making by MACs admits the possibil-













































Fiscal Intermediary / Medicare Administrative Contractor (“MAC”)
Figure 1: Predicted Paid Home Hemodialysis (HHD) and In-Center
Hemodialysis (IHD) Treatments per Month by MAC, “Typical” Medicare
Dialysis Patient, 2009 and 2012
Notes. Predictions for the “typical” dialysis patient—defined using modal patient-month character-
istics for discrete variables andmean body surface area—derived from results of OLSmodels with
patient treatments per month as dependent variable and MAC dummies as individual variables
(ref. MAC 14), adjusted for patient demographics, 23 important comorbidities, and other factors.
Separate OLSmodels by modality by year. R2 ranges across models (2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012):
0.193–0.223 for HHD, 0.069–0.097 for IHD.
Table 4: Linear Probability Model of Home Hemodialysis (HHD) Program
Presence (2010–2012), Regression Results
Variable Est. SE
Lagged (-1) MAC-year average paid HHD treatments per patient-month 0.0037 0.0033
IHD program presence 0.2434 0.0540**
HPD program presence 0.2925 0.0119**
Year 2011 (2010 ref.) 0.0033 0.0035
Year 2012 (2010 ref.) 0.0084 0.0071
Intercept 0.1999 0.0589*
Notes.N = 16,013 facility-years.
*p < .01; **p < .0001.
HPD, home peritoneal dialysis; IHD, in-center hemodialysis; MAC, Medicare administrative
contractor; SE, standard errors.
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beneficiaries as well as providers’ service offerings and patterns of care.
Despite opportunities for reducing such administrative variation through reg-
ulatory interventions, this driver of variation in utilization has received rela-
tively little attention in the literature on regional variation in health care.
In the case of patients undergoing hemodialysis care during 2009–2012,
we find striking, persistent variation across MACs with respect to the number
of paid HHD treatments per patient-month—controlling for differences in
patient risk—and hence the number of treatments a given patient might be
expected to receive. Dialysis facilities may have observed this variation—par-
ticularly large dialysis organizations submitting claims to different MACs in
different geographic regions—just as hemodialysis equipment suppliers have
(NxStage Medical, Inc. 2012). However, in our investigation of this variation’s
potential consequences for dialysis facility operations and service offerings,
we found a positive but not statistically significant effect of a MAC’s greater
willingness to pay for additional HHD treatments on the presence of facility
HHD programs.
The limitations of our analysis include that the financial incentives
encouraging the use of HHD rather than IHD that were faced by dialysis facil-
ities evolved during our study period, intensifying significantly as of 2011.
Additionally, HHD use has continued to grow in recent years (United States
Renal Data System 2015). Both trends could increase dialysis facilities’ aware-
ness of the variation in MAC payment decisions we observe and the opportu-
nity to increase reimbursement in areas where MACs are more likely to pay
for additional treatments. Consequently, in the future we may observe growth
in HHD programs in areas where MACs typically pay for more treatments.
On the other hand, these trends and associated rising aggregate costs of HHD
treatments could also lead MACs to reconsider their interpretations of medi-
cal justification in this context and institute new standards more often restrict-
ing payment for HHD services, potentially reducing variation across MACs
and, consequently, variation in provider responses. More recent data could
reveal the net effects of these opposing mechanisms on patterns of facility
operations and services offerings and implications for dialysis patients’ access
to and use of HHD therapy.
If further research demonstrates that the variation we observe in health
care use due to MAC discretionary decision making represents inefficiency in
care practice as well as inequitable access to health care services, CMS author-
ities may consider certain regulatory interventions to minimize this variation.
For example, regulators could issue more explicit guidance to MACs to stan-
dardize protocols for assessing medical necessity.
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In addition, policy makers may worry that large provider organizations
interested in providing more HHD treatments could seek to have their claims
adjudicated byMACsmore likely to interpret medical justification regulations
expansively, strictly for the purpose of increasing revenue. Current CMS
rules governing the linkage of individual provider facilities to MACs, in place
since 2006, assign them to the MACs with jurisdiction over the areas where
their individual facilities are located. However, CMS is also permitted to grant
large provider groups an exception to these rules, enabling the assignment of
all facilities within the groups to the single MAC with jurisdiction over the
region where the providers’ home office is located (Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services 2013). While this policy is somewhat restrictive (Assign-
ment of Providers and Suppliers to MACs 2006), CMS could integrate an
evaluation of claims payment denial rates under the provider group’s current
MAC assignments into the process by which it is determined whether such an
exception should be granted.
A more comprehensive review of CMS’s guidance to MACs as well as
examinations of other, nondialysis services using recent data could be valu-
able in quantifying the contribution of MACs’ heterogeneous claims adjudica-
tion practices to geographic variation in provider practice patterns (IOM
2013) as well as downstream variation in patients’ outcomes and experiences
of care.
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